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Abstract  
Knowledge brokerage is an ambiguous concept that is increasingly embedded in different 
scientific disciplines. It was primarily introduced due to the rise of information and 
communications technology, which rendered scientific findings more accessible to the policy-
making communities. This information boom made gradually more evident the fact that 
knowledge is not something produced in laboratories and disseminated to policy makers to 
solely satisfy their problem-solving demands. Instead this new trend saw knowledge 
communities acquiring an active role in policy-making and therefore directly affecting this 
previously independent realm. New knowledge centers, think tanks among them, entered the 
policy/knowledge nexus and influenced the way practitioners hypothesized and applied 
scientific results, while at the same time they guided scientific research to seemingly more 
practical orientations. Knowledge brokers are now considered to constitute the de facto 
linkages between scientists and policy makers, aspiring to bridge the two worlds. However, 
their emerging power has raised some criticism, as think tanks are currently trying to balance 
between their role of bridging scientific theory and policy-making and their function of 
fostering, and occasionally lobbying, certain agendas. In this thesis, I try to elucidate to what 
extent knowledge brokers, such as think tanks, still fulfill their original role and to what 
extent they have mutated into institutions promoting specific agendas.   
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Defining the Object of Study 
 
“Scientia potentia est, sed parda” 
Thomas Hobbes Leviathan   
 
“Knowledge is power, but a minor one” is the literal translation of this Latin quote first found 
in the Latin edition of Thomas Hobbes’ Leviathan, part 1 (De Homine), Chapter X ("De 
Potentia, Dignitate et Honore”). In today’s world this quote would certainly require further 
elaboration. Knowledge of what, created by whom, for what purposes and what particular 
interests? Abstractly, this constitutes the topic of this thesis; my aim being to provide a few, 
if limited, answers to these general questions. 
 
Recent years have seen an ever-increasing complexity in the production of knowledge, 
whether in its origins; being no longer the only child of universities and research foundations 
but also think-tanks and (non-)profit organizations, or its application and/or motivation; 
originating not only from formulated hypotheses later verified or dispatched by empirical 
evidence, but also from preconceived notions aimed to promote certain agendas. In this 
thesis, I attempt to systematically examine where think tanks lie in the relation between 
these two concepts; are think tanks arenas where social scientists produce independent 
evidence-based knowledge as they claim in their statutes and mission statements? Are they 
instruments of power demands dressing interests and agendas of different power centers in 
the cloth of scientific expertise? Or do they rather lie somewhere in the middle, linking the 
two worlds by producing knowledge that is based on scientific methodologies and data 
which is at the same time informed by the tacit knowledge of policy makers? If the latter is 
the case, what means and processes do think tank members employ to achieve this linkage? 
Structure of the Thesis 
Initially, I try to provide a comprehensive overview of the approaches used by scholars to 
analyze the think tank phenomenon. I briefly criticize these approaches as governed by a 
“methodological nationalism” that employs a historical approach which focuses on 
measuring think tanks’ influence within state boundaries, eventually leading to the 
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conclusion that think tanks are partisan organizations that advocate one or another pre-
established ideology. I then survey the sparse literature that specifically focuses on Brussels-
based think tanks and I try to explain why the former theoretical approaches fail to analyze 
these organizations that are still in their infancy. In the second section of the theoretical 
part, I introduce certain theoretical insights found in the scholarly analysis of knowledge 
brokerage from interdisciplinary perspectives, emphasizing the role of individuals in 
successful knowledge brokerage. This is required since my empirical analysis primarily 
focuses on think tanks’ populations, namely the individuals and groups that constitute a 
think tank as an organization.  
 
In the empirical part of the thesis, I describe some of the most important Brussels-based 
think tanks, their brokerage strategies and mechanisms. I use empirical evidence from 
interviews with think tank members I conducted in Brussels, along with some quantitative 
analysis of the occupational backgrounds of researchers and manager staff. I then set a 
hypothesis about the role of networks in the production of think tanks innovative 
contributions. Literature on Brussels-based think tanks is still in its infancy and think tanks do 
not date far back. For that reason, particular trends in their influence have not been 
systematically proven or their actual positions, in the European political and knowledge 
structures, accurately pinpointed. Therefore, I adopt an interdisciplinary perspective to 
analyze the information I retrieved.  
 
As mentioned earlier, I introduce two scenaria, namely that (i) think tanks as research 
institutes adhere to an informative role, bridging research in social sciences and the 
corporate world/administrative agencies (ii) certain think tank members champion certain 
agendas, at either the research or the policy recommendation level. It needs to be stated 
from the outset, that the findings are not meant to strictly validate one or the other 
hypothesis. Instead, I seek to explore the possibilities for a synthesis of the two and in order 
to do so, I include in my analysis as many empirical elements as possible, especially given the 
aforementioned lack of corroborated evidence on how these specific European institutions 
function and the role they perform in the European environment. 
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The data used in this thesis and their relation to the theoretical framework are based on 7 
individual interviews and one group interview conducted in Brussels, with think tank 
members during the period 4-9/5/2015. More specifically, five individual interviews took 
place in Bruegel office on Monday, May 4, 2015; 2 with the European Policy members on the 
5th and 7th of May, while the group interview was held in Carnegie Europe on May 7th.  
Secondary resources such as memos, policy briefs, membership programs, reports and other 
publications collected during groundwork are also utilized. Interviews’ analysis is based on 
discovering, as well as interpreting, common perspectives and practices with respect to the 
modes of brokerage examined. I include passages from the interviews whenever the 
personal opinions of the correspondents provide insights about their role in the think tank’s 
function and their interpretation of the sort of research they produce. I consider the 
discourse used in these interviews in its informative dimension, as I regard interviewees as 
genuine insiders of this societal space, rather than ideologically predisposed individuals. 
Quantitative research is conducted to highlight some aspects of the professional 
backgrounds of think tank researchers, contributors and participants with the aim of proving 
their independence from political and corporate interests.  
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Introduction 
 
The Lisbon Treaty strengthened the role of the European Parliament by expanding the policy 
areas for which the co-decision process is required. The EP is now a legitimate co-legislator 
with increased budgetary powers1. The European Parliament to better manage its increased 
workload is divided in specialized committees; “the committees draw up, amend and adopt 
legislative proposals and own-initiative reports”2. Among them, the Economic and Monetary 
Affairs committee has gained significant importance as it holds accountable the European 
Central Bank and it has the power to initiate legislation and provide input to the works of the 
European Commission and the Council. 
 
A first look at the membership in the Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee raises two 
important questions for anyone who wishes to investigate the professional backgrounds of 
the participating Parliamentarians. Firstly, their CVs are not always available in the EP’s 
Committee website. This can be considered less grave since an online research can provide 
adequate information on their professional and educational backgrounds. The second 
problem, however, is somehow more important and it raises serious doubts about the ability 
of the Parliamentarians who take part in the Economic Committee to actually conduct 
economic analysis and initiate legislation that concerns the people of the European Union. 
An initial research showed that out of 61 permanent members of the Committee, only 37 of 
them exhibit an educational background in economics or similar disciplines3. This number 
includes Parliamentarians with a diploma or higher degree in business administration, public 
administration and economic law. The number drops substantially if one includes only 
degrees in economic science.  
 
A diploma in economics is no proof of adequate knowledge of the economic science much as 
a master’s degree in political engineering, for instance, is no sign of a lack of adequate 
comprehension of economic affairs. It is often the case that practical knowledge and 
                                                          
1
 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/aboutparliament/en/20150201PVL00022/The-EP-and-the-treaties 
2
 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/aboutparliament/en/20150201PVL00010/Organisation-and-rules 
3
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/committees/en/econ/members.html;jsessionid=4FF47C2DD190C6FA35C8F18
0FE9B7A72.node1 
11 
 
professional experience can replace or even provide a better background for understanding 
complex economic and monetary matters. However, it is beyond doubt that a number of 
these members, through their participation in this committee, are being introduced to a 
topic they do not necessarily understand. Moreover, they are asked to initiate legislation 
and to evaluate proposals on such topics that affect the lives of the people of the European 
Union. The importance for these members to receive adequate, brief but concise, 
information on economic affairs that are becoming more and more complex becomes 
evident. Equally evident is the importance of the sources of such information and the role of 
informed knowledge for policy-making overall.  
 
In general, the reasons for this rising interest in the sources and dissemination of social 
sciences can be attributed to the rising complexities of the problems policy makers need to 
deal with. The advent of the information revolution that occurred due to the emergence of 
the Internet, the breakthrough technological innovations that revolutionized production 
eventually leading to commercial globalization, the rise of new participants in the knowledge 
producing and policy making processes have cumulatively posed serious challenges to 
efficient and well-informed policy making. 
 
Simultaneously, issues were raised on the quality of the provided knowledge. Social 
scientists gradually shifted their base, from academic departments to other occupational 
settings, such as advisor companies, think tanks and administrative agencies, where they 
produce social science but for different reasons and for different purposes. The autonomy of 
the scientific field was put in question by this mobilization and that pitted the democratic 
character of the policy making process in jeopardy of competing interests and motivation. 
Given that think tanks possess a central role between policy experts and policy makers, they 
merit meticulous study, in order to unravel if they are indeed independent, or rather 
subservient, knowledge brokers and providers.  
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Part I. General Literature on Think Tanks  
A common problem faced by scholars who have analyzed the think tank phenomenon is that 
it is extremely difficult to provide an adequate definition of think tanks. One of the first and 
most common definitions is the one provided by McGann and Weaver (2004 :4) with think 
tanks described as “non-governmental, not-for profit research organizations with substantial 
organizational autonomy from government and from societal interests such as firms, interest 
groups, and political parties”. This definition has received criticism from other scholars who 
doubt that independence (from profit-seeking activities and an independence in 
organizational structure) actually constitutes a typical characteristic of think tanks ( Pautz 
2011: 421, Medvetz 2012: 24). From one such institute to another one can find differences in 
organizational structure, size,  the degree of advocacy of policy recommendations, the 
plurality (or not) of their funding resources, the professional background of the personnel 
employed in them and so on. Trying to provide an exact definition threatens to guide 
research towards approaches that miss the plurality and controversy surrounding the think 
tank phenomenon altogether.  
What is equally surprising is that what seems to be more important than actually defining 
think tanks is to describe and analyze what they do; what their main functions in the political 
environment they evolve are. Since think tanks have proliferated in the USA more than 
anywhere in the world, milestone analyses of think tanks have tried to examine their role in 
the major ideological debates of the US. James Smith for instance, wrote his book The Idea 
Brokers: Think Tanks and the Rise of the New Policy Elite (1991) where he presented a 
historical analysis of the rise of think tanks in 20th century America and the subsequent 
advent of policy experts as legitimate actors in the policy-making process. He employed a 
macro-level of analysis in order to investigate the role performed by think tanks in 
advocating ideas during the grand political debates of the United States. This historical form 
of analysis has governed most major works on the think tank phenomenon, guiding research 
towards a historical-institutional perspective that places think tanks within larger policy 
communities or advocacy coalitions that push their common beliefs and agendas in policy 
debates. Medvetz’s sociological perspectives (2011), which will be discussed later in the 
thesis, also abide by this “methodological nationalism” that explicitly or unconsciously links 
think tanks to national partisan interests and ideologies. Diane Stone recognizes this 
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problem when she writes that “Anglo-American definitions of think tanks have prevailed in 
the scholarly literature and reflected the socio-political context in which think tanks were 
first constituted” (2008, 3). Her analysis of the transnational networks think tanks participate 
in can be interpreted as an effort to broaden these former approaches.  
The historical evolution of the numerous American think tanks, which can be found in all 
relevant and most cited scholarly works on the topic (Weaver 1989, Smith 1991, McGann 
1995, McGann and Weaver 2004, Abelson 2006 inter alia) reveals multifaceted interaction 
and intricate interplay between, on the one hand think tank policy experts and researchers 
and on the other, university departments, donors, foundations, political parties, public 
officials, corporations and the media world. This interaction and the subsequent inter-
dependence are inherent in the nature of think tanks as organizations that lie in the middle 
of these different worlds. Historical analyses have provided valuable insights in how think 
tanks manage to balance between them in an effort to combine autonomy and heteronomy 
(Medvetz 2012).  
The problem with these approaches in examining Brussels-based think tanks is that these 
institutes are, compared to their American counterparts, contemporary constructions. A 
historical approach is difficult to deliver definite results on how Brussels-based think tanks 
have been and are still participating in the power relations that take place in Brussels. Most 
such organizations share a 30 to 10 year old history and although there are instances of 
them participating in the big political and ideological debates guiding the process of the 
European integration, such an analysis would require immediate and inside knowledge of 
their exact role in this process.  
Moreover, the nature of the political and governance system of the European Union 
mandates an approach that departs from the traditional national guidelines in which 
American think tanks proliferated. In the absence of clear ideological debates and within the 
boundaries of a depoliticized European project long left to European elites to unravel 
(Hooghe and Marks 2008), Brussels-based think tanks do not expose a degree of partisanship 
similar to the American ones. Ideology has, so far, played only a minor role in the European 
integration process and think tanks’ role seems to have been restricted to analyze particular 
issues, mainly economic ones, concerning the debate of “lesser” or more Europe.  
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In this point of view, the advent of less traditional power centers in the European Union and 
the multi-level mode of governance mandate a theoretical approach that explores think 
tanks’ role in this mosaic of different interests in a more neutral manner, while providing 
only exploratory insights about the exact place think tanks occupy in European power 
struggles. The literature on knowledge brokerage offers such a framework. In the first part of 
the literature review I try to cover the majority of the approaches employed by scholars to 
unravel the think tank phenomenon. I then introduce insights from the knowledge 
brokerage framework which I make use of in the empirical component of my thesis.  
Scholarly Analysis on Think Tanks 
Medvetz (2012) and Stone (1998, 2004) offer a taxonomy of the scholarly analysis of the 
think-tank phenomenon. Think tanks have been studied through the prism of four main 
theoretical frameworks. Firstly, elite theory perspectives portray think tanks as instruments 
of elite groups and power centers that advance the particular agenda of the dominant class 
(Medvetz 2012 : 18; Stone 2004: 12; 1998: 13). Thomas Dye (1978) for instance, incorporates 
think tanks (private policy-planning organizations) in his oligarchic model of national policy-
making. Dye examines cross-cutting memberships in three influential foreign affairs’ 
organizations, the Council of Foreign Relations, the Brookings Institution and the Committee 
of Economic Development. His findings provide insight into how these organizations operate 
as negotiating environments for leaderships from various power groups, such as the 
corporate and financial sector, the foundations, mass media and influential government 
members (ibid. p. 312). According to this theory, these elites set the political agenda long 
before it reaches the “proximate policy-makers” (the elected law-making bodies) and 
constitute an integral part of “the means” of public policy (p.330).  
Secondly, neo-Marxist, and more specifically neo-Gramscian scholars have tried to analyze 
the influence of think tanks and their function in national structures. Scholars in this 
category emphasize the role of classes and set think tanks against a background of dominant 
hegemonic projects, a sort of “critical elite perspective” which for reasons of parsimony can 
fall within the first category of elite theory approaches (Desai 1994; Parmar 2004: 19-33; 
Pautz 2011). Desai (1994) for instance, offers a meticulous critique of the role played by 
British think tanks, most importantly the Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA) and the Center 
for Policy Studies (CPS), as vehicles of legitimization of Thatcherite policies. Similarly to Dye, 
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Desai paints a picture of these think tanks as laboratories of New Right economic ideology 
that Thatcher implemented when she came to power. Following Gramsci, she describes how 
after the Keynesian social welfare paradigm (Hall 1992) begun to be questioned, “intellectual 
sects” of the New Right, whose origins are traced back in the 1940’s, came to the fore and 
struggled to fill in the vacuum of hegemony, while dominating the traditional intellectual 
world (Desai 1994: 38-40). In her words, think tanks were “proselytizers, not originators” and 
although they failed to render Thatcherism a dominant worldview, since it never succeeded 
in gaining the consent of the entire society, they succeeded in their most critical function of 
“working out aspects of this ideology into feasible plans and blueprints, ready for 
implementation” (ibid. p. 62).  
Both aforementioned approaches, elitist and Gramscian are “essentialist” in character 
(Medvetz 2012, 19), adopting an instrumentalist approach to think tanks as a tool used by 
national elites to advance their particular interests. Thus, they tend to fail to adequately 
describe and understand the variety and multiplicity present within think tanks traditions. 
The pluralist perspective assigns to think tanks a role similar to other interest-based groups, 
such as lobbying firms, labor unions and other societal organizations that aim to influence 
public policy for promotion of their particular interests (Medvetz 2012 : 18-19, Stone 2004: 
12-13). Therefore, pluralist studies incorporate think tanks within the bigger numbers of 
interest groups, lobbyists, NGO’s, churches that promote informed-based opinion making by 
antagonizing with each other in the “democratic market place of ideas”. These pluralist 
approaches emphasize the “intellectual characteristics” of think tanks and their role in 
expanding the market place of ideas and furthering democratic processes by bringing in their 
knowledge-based expertise (Weiss 1990). An intrinsic caveat of the pluralistic approach, in a 
rather similar fashion to the elite theories, is it disproportionately focuses on the effects of 
think tanks on and shaping public opinion and thus public policy, often underestimating 
more undiscernible effects that think tanks may exert on power centers in which they are 
situated (Medvetz 2012:19; Stone, 2004: 13). 
Finally, institutionalism constitutes the more recent approach to analyzing think tanks 
(Medvetz 2012: 22-23) with Ronald Abelson (1998, 2002, 2004, 2014) and Diane Stone 
(1996, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2004, 2008) as its main exponents. The institutionalist approach 
aims to elucidate “the structural environments in which think tanks are embedded, the rules 
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and norms that shape their behavior and the organizational arrangements and processes to 
which they must respond” (Medvetz ibid. 22). Stone accordingly (2004: 13-15) places 
approaches as variant (but in essence all institutional) as “policy communities”, “epistemic 
communities”, “advocacy coalitions” and “discourse coalitions” under this general 
framework. In a 2001 article, Stone examines think tanks in the context of transnational 
knowledge networks where they operate in epistemic communities, as well as advocacy 
networks, to illuminate and influence global social policy (350-352). Drawing on Simon 
James’ categorization of policy influence, Stone finds that think tanks advance knowledge 
and policy transfers through “lesson drawing” in interconnected networks of professional 
associations, NGO’s, and policy makers. Through networks channels, think tanks participate 
in the genesis of ideas, their formulation and their implementation (ibid. p. 339). Stone’s 
analysis is thorough and multidimensional, but the main problem remains as in every 
institutionalist approach to the think tank phenomenon; why study and try to measure think 
tanks influence if it is so difficult to pin down? In her own words, “…general statements 
about think tank influences on social policy are to be treated with caution” (ibid. p. 339) 
Maybe the initial question and hypothesis can be introduced on a different basis; namely, 
think tanks as organizations serve a different function that certain think tank members 
individually?  
What both Stone and Medvetz agree upon is that all the above approaches, institutionalist 
included, fail to capture the specific “societal space” that think tanks occupy within the 
general institutional framework they are embedded in; think tanks “in the last instance 
operate alone” (Stone 2004: 15). This particularity is derived from the think tanks position in 
a milieu of political, intellectual, fund-raising and media fields (Medvetz 2012: 22) which 
determine not only think tanks’ influence in the decision-making process but as importantly 
their characteristics and the ways they apprehend themselves as actors;  in other words, 
their “distinctive social and organizational forms” (ibid. 24). Along the same lines, Stone 
states that “think tank impact is multifaceted and varies within different constituencies – 
within the media, politicians and political party, the general public, civil servants or within 
policy communities” (2001 : 339).  
Thomas Medvetz (2012) drawing on different sociological approaches like Pierre Bourdieu’s 
field theory (1984, 1985, 1991) and Gil Eyal’s sociology of interventions (2010) researches 
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the history and functions of American think tanks. His findings lead him to describe think 
tanks as “members of an interstitial field or a semi-structured network of organizations that 
traverses, links, and overlaps the more established spheres of academic, political, business, 
and media production” (p. 31). For that reason Medvetz asserts, think tanks need to perform 
a complex balancing act; at one time they need to stress their independence from those 
parent fields, their cognitive autonomy. At the same time they need to signal their 
dependence on them, their willingness to subdue their research production to these other 
fields, in order to gain from the material and symbolic benefits they confer (p. 49).  
Unfortunately, this process has its repercussions for the scientific vigor of the research 
produced as “think tanks may still produce a nullifying effect on the value of expertise itself” 
(p. 166).  Medvetz’ s overall conclusion is that think tanks’ growth has “undermined the 
relevance of autonomously produced scientific knowledge in the United States and that it 
should be set analytically against the backdrop of the subordination of knowledge to political 
and economic demand” (p. 204). 
Medvetz has very eloquently captured and described the societal space that think tanks 
maintain within different social worlds in modern societies. Medvetz’ analysis on the 
boundary work conducted by think tanks is a very useful tool to analyze the think tank 
phenomenon, mapping the sociological space it occupies and considering structural as well 
as individual power struggles as sources of social engineering. However, the conclusion that 
the knowledge think tanks produce is a kind of a “lesser knowledge”, much as his think tanks 
can be considered a “lesser field”, is somewhat precarious (163). It seems to me that his 
argument is somehow tautological; think tanks are dependent on the traditional fields of the 
political, corporate and media sectors for funding and symbolic resources, visibility and 
prestige. They also need to be independent from such sectors, in order to produce and 
disseminate vigorous research. But such total independency may be in reality unattainable, 
given that the corporate world, (inter)national institutions, state agencies are part and 
parcel of the kind of research think tanks engage in. Policy research that does not take into 
consideration the exigencies of the aforementioned think tank stakeholders would in all 
probability be policy research conducted in universities. Policy research conducted in think 
tanks is a kind of knowledge with practical applicability that resides in between these 
different fields, as Medvetz corroborates, but is at the same time informed and articulated 
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by them, namely by knowledge brokering mechanisms that I elaborate on in the empirical 
component of my thesis. 
Literature on Brussels-based think tanks 
Within the so far mentioned literature, research focusing on European think tanks is rather 
sparse. Ullrich (2004) offers a typology of European think tanks, as national and 
transnational actors. According to Ullrich, European think tanks function within a variety of 
conceptual approaches, policy communities, epistemic communities, advocacy coalitions 
and policy entrepreneurs (63-64). Accordingly, Stone (2008, 8) notices that networks “often 
represent the most feasible organizational mode through which transnational activity is 
secured”. The most influential description and categorization of European think tanks came 
from a think tank publication in 2004. The Notre Europe think tank, led by Stephen Boucher, 
provided an analysis of national and Brussels-based think tanks that focused on European 
topics. In this report, drawing on previous scholarly analysis of think tanks, the authors 
provide nine criteria for what in their perception constitutes a think tank and which 
institutions they decided to include in their research (Boucher et al. 2004, 3). Subsequently, 
they offer a typology of think tanks, categorizing them in academic think tanks, advocacy 
think tanks, contract research organizations and political party think tanks. Missiroli and 
Ioannides in a BEPA paper (one of the internal Commission expert groups) in 2012 (p. 8) 
adopt nine criteria as a baseline for their categorization, though emphasizing their flexibility. 
This flexibility indicates the heterogeneity of think tanks and the difficulty in placing them 
into solely one of the above categories. It also confirms how the traditional institutional 
approaches fail to capture the complexity inherent in the think tank phenomenon.  
At this point, it is also worth mentioning a concrete effort to link the theoretical knowledge 
brokerage framework and Brussels-based think tanks in a recent article by Marybel Perez 
(2014). Perez investigates how the institutional environment of the European Union shapes 
think tanks’ brokerage functions and guides them to maximizing gains for these 
organizations. She recognizes four aspects of EU policy-making system that affect think 
tanks’ knowledge brokerage functions i) the emphasis on participative processes ii) concern 
of stakeholders’ representatives iii) development frameworks (brokerage platforms) 
facilitated by the EU settings and iv) the lack of an overarching European sphere (2014, 324). 
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I draw insights from this specific research to examine how European structures shape think 
tank knowledge brokerage roles. In my study I aspire to extend her findings on the effect of 
somewhat neglected in her article, aspect of knowledge, due to her primary focus on 
structural-institutional effects. Therefore, I base my empirical analysis primarily emphasizing 
the think tanks’ internal organization and structure to examine how they affect knowledge 
brokerage and production.  
The Rise of the Knowledge Broker 
Knowledge brokerage is an ambiguous concept that is increasingly embedded in different 
scientific disciplines. It was primarily introduced due to the rise of information and 
communications technology, which rendered scientific findings more accessible to the 
policy- making communities. This information boom made gradually more evident the fact 
that knowledge is not something produced in laboratories and disseminated to policy 
makers to solely satisfy their problem-solving demands. Instead this new trend saw 
knowledge communities acquiring an active role in policy-making and therefore directly 
affecting this previously independent realm. New knowledge centers, think tanks among 
them, entered the policy/knowledge nexus and influenced the way practitioners 
hypothesized and applied scientific results, while at the same time they guided scientific 
research to seemingly more practical orientations. Knowledge brokers are now considered 
to constitute the de facto linkages between scientists and policy makers, aspiring to bridge 
the two worlds. However, their emerging power has raised some criticism, as think tanks are 
currently trying to balance between their role of bridging scientific theory and policy-making 
and their unexpected new function of fostering, and occasionally lobbying, certain agendas.  
The idea that scientists and practitioners constitute two totally separate communities with 
different aims and different perspectives, rarely in touch with one another, was commonly 
found in the literature (Weiss 1976, Kaplan 1979). With the advent of communication and 
technological innovation this idea gradually gave place to a framework that dissociated 
scientific knowledge from its direct instrumental use for the policy makers, based on a linear 
model of basic research-applied research-development- application (Weiss 1979, 427).  
Instead, focus was shifted to a more “cyclical”, interactive model that was meant to include 
more than one knowledge centers in the process of shaping political outcomes where policy 
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makers were the subjects of “tacit knowledge” accumulated through experience and 
interactions with many sets of participants other that scientists (ibid.). This model assumed 
that problems dealt with by policy makers were rarely explicitly identified and that the 
policy-making process was shaped “gradually without the formality of agenda deliberation 
and choice”, in other words “the policy accretes” (Weiss 1989, 382). This approach has 
implications also for researchers who engage in a constant dialogue with the policy makers 
seeking detachment from the policy making world, while in the same time are exploring 
communication strategies to provide service to the policy makers (Hutjes 1991, 12). The 
problem was that the scientific world lacked the know-how and resources to achieve these 
communication strategies and that puzzle brought to the fore the concept of knowledge 
brokers as intermediate individuals or groups that could serve as linkage agents. As bridges 
between the research and policy making communities the power and influence of 
knowledge brokers became evident and gathered more and more interest in scholarly 
analysis, gradually investigating the value of the exact position a broker occupied within a 
network of the two communities’ social relations.  
An overview of the Literature on Knowledge Brokers 
 In organizational analysis “knowledge brokerage” is a research framework that tries to 
explain the process by which ideas and knowledge are diffused between different 
organizations, providing an explanation for the link between learning and innovation 
(Hardagon 2002). These organizations “move between multiple domains rather than pursue 
centrality within any one…moving ideas from one domain to another” (ibid. 46). 
Communication science has witnessed a growing interest in knowledge brokering in which 
“intermediaries link the producers and users of knowledge to strengthen the generation, 
dissemination and eventual use of that knowledge” (Bielak et al. 2010, p. 203). This is a 
result of the fact that “science must be socially distributed, application-oriented, 
transdisciplinary, and subject to multiple accountabilities. From a one-way linear process, 
science is evolving to a multi-party, recursive dialogue” (ibid.).  
Linking knowledge brokerage and social network analysis Ronald Burt develops the idea that 
people who stand in between “structural holes”- those places in the network structure 
where information between the different clusters of the network is not redundant- exploit 
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brokerage mechanisms “building relations across the holes” (2004, 351). Situated in the 
interface between heterogeneous groups, knowledge brokers are more open to their 
influence, synthesizing ideas and perspectives that can later bring to their area of expertise, 
converting brokerage into social capital. Adopting Burt’s framework but focusing more on 
agency and individual behaviors rather than on structural antecedents of brokerage and 
social capital, Boari & Riboldazzi (2014) examine the process by which actors maintain and 
evolve their brokerage roles as well as how they develop new ones (ibid. p. 683). According 
to these authors, brokerage is an evolving mechanism that actors engage in, in order to 
manage but also reshape their network. From them I borrow a working definition of 
knowledge brokers as individuals or organizations who function as bridges or gatekeepers 
that mediate the flow of knowledge and information between two unconnected actors, 
whether they belong to the same or different subgroups or networks (ibid.).   
Much research on knowledge brokers has come from Canadian scientists and researchers. A 
reason for that can be partly attributed to the technological and scientific advancement of 
the country as well as its political system, a mixture of federal, provincial and municipal 
modes of governance. The importance of multi-level governance for the advent of 
knowledge brokers will be further examined in this thesis in referral to the European Union. 
For the time being, I will briefly present some insights from Canadian writers on different 
areas of public policy where knowledge brokerage can be useful. In health policy knowledge 
brokering is “all the activity that links decision makers with researchers, facilitating their 
interaction so that they are able to better understand each other's goals and professional 
cultures, influence each other's work, forge new partnerships, and promote the use of 
research-based evidence in decision-making” (Lomas 2007: 129).  Between the worlds of 
research and policy making this mediating function is performed through “the translation of 
opportunities constraints and findings between the two communities” (Lomas 1997: 440) 
that will otherwise maintain their “often misplaced ideas about each other’s environment” 
(ibid. 439). In 2003, the Canadian Health Services Research Foundation (CHSRF) presented 
the findings of a nation-wide consultation on the importance of knowledge brokerage and 
suggested strategies for its successful implementation. The importance of knowledge 
brokers in the Canadian Health system has also been examined in an often-cited paper by 
Oldham and McLean (1997). The importance of knowledge brokers, outside Canada, has also 
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been investigated in environmental policy (Sverisson 2001), development studies (Fisher & 
Vogel, 2008) and sustainable sanitation (Bijker et al. 2012). This inter (-) and transdisciplinary 
utilization of knowledge brokerage points to the ambiguity of the concept, and its 
applicability in different scientific fields. It is also manifest by the number of other concepts, 
such as knowledge translation (for an overview Greenhalgh and Wieringa 2011, Sverisson 
2001), knowledge mobilization (Levin 2013), that share similar characteristics as in the above 
mentioned literature.  
What is worth mentioning is that knowledge in most of these approaches is not used in its 
essentialist meaning4, as something used with the purpose of bettering our lives (Liew 2007). 
Particularly in the literature that connects knowledge to networks, it is used as an asset, a 
resource used by skilled agents in order to advance their relational position in the network 
they occupy. It is congruent to learning processes that help an agent use insights from two 
or more different groups in order to come up with innovative ideas. This is most evident in 
Burt’s analysis of structural holes and how they ameliorate an agent’s social capital. In Burt’s 
words “The social capital metaphor is that the people who do better are somehow better 
connected” (2001, 202).  
In this thesis on Brussels-based think tanks the concept of brokerage will be used loosely 
defined, and the emphasis will be put not so much on what it means in theoretical terms, 
but how knowledge brokerage is performed in practice, through what mechanisms and 
strategies and what are the advantages that accrue to knowledge brokers. How the history 
of think tanks and the personal capital of their members, the networks in which think tanks 
have been established and developed, guide the knowledge brokerage function of think 
tanks and how do they enable or inhibit innovative ideas. Special focus will be given to the 
importance of social capital, built on knowledge and expertise, as a brokerage facilitator and 
eventually a source of power for think tank members. But before moving to the effect of 
networks of brokerage on agent’s social capital I will try to shed some light on actual 
meaning of the word knowledge, as the specific research produced in think tanks; research 
which draws insights from academia, policy makers, institutions and empirical evidence. A 
common thread running the above mentioned contributions to the knowledge brokerage 
                                                          
4
 Knowledge is the (1) cognition or recognition (know-what), (2) capacity to act (know-how), and (3) 
understanding (know-why) that resides or is contained within the mind or in the brain. 
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literature is that knowledge brokers lie somewhere in between worlds, peripheries (Meyer 
2010, 122), domains or occupations, thus they are interstitial by nature.  
 
A community of knowledge Brokers? 
 The importance of social science knowledge and how it should be brought in and utilized in 
practical public policy has been a recurring topic in institutional and public policy literature. 
Radaelli (1995) provides an overview of the main theoretical approaches that seek to explain 
the relation between social knowledge and power. What is most interesting here, is that 
Radaelli, drawing on Lindquist (1998: 38) introduces the role of a “third community” 
between social scientists and policy makers a community that consists of individuals 
(political consultants, think tanks, idea brokers, directors of influential policy institutes) that 
participate and impact the various stages of the policy-making process (Radaelli 1995: 176-
178). Their impact is most evident on the intermediate level of ideas in circumstances of 
uncertainty, with information data (retrieved mainly by university departments) at one end 
of the continuum and arguments (brought into the debate by advocacy coalitions) at the 
other. At a first glance it seems peculiar to include think tanks, as organizations, in the same 
category as individuals. In Radaelli’s formulation think tanks serve as idea brokers at the 
micro-level of analysis, emphasizing the importance of single individuals, in a similar fashion 
as examining the role of unorthodox economists in exercising political influence.  
However, think tanks are organized entities with an internal structure and hierarchy that 
comprise not only of experts with policy-relevant knowledge but also of researchers that 
provide data and conduct field work to assist and facilitate the work of the analysts, or work 
as administrative staff who oversees the well-functioning of the organization. Think tanks 
are usually governed by a structure of Member Councils and Director Boards that only 
independently participate in think tanks’ management or research production. Nonetheless, 
think tanks, in the common use of the term are synonym to the more eminent figures of 
their organization, usually their Directors (i.e. Daniel Gross- CEPS, Guntram B. Wolff- 
Bruegel), their most eminent founding resources (i.e. George Soros-Open Society 
Foundations) or their founders (Jacques Delors-Notre Europe). It is exactly this peculiar co-
existence of individual and organizational traits (in terms of how organizational structure 
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shapes the sort of knowledge produced) that characterizes the think tank phenomenon and 
makes it difficult to grasp. It is a synthesis of these two levels of analysis I will make use of in 
this thesis, doing justice to the numbers of young professionals, researchers who work and 
spend their time in think tanks’ offices and libraries helping the advancement of the specific 
kind of knowledge think tanks produce, while examining the role of elite individuals, policy-
experts that have connected their name to the organizations they represent.  
 
Research Question and Three Main Hypotheses 
My main focus is to shed some light on the role of these different think tanks constituencies, 
the different groups of professionals, one can find in the think tank hierarchy. I seek to 
answer the question: what is the function of these different groups of people for the research 
conducted by Brussels-based think tanks and in order to answer that I introduce three main 
hypotheses:  
1) Brussels-based think tanks are more independent from their American counterparts for 
structural reasons but also due to the professional backgrounds of the researchers they 
employ.  
2) Brussels-based think tanks are led by a minority of individuals who are part of an 
interconnected European elite network. This phenomenon blurs the boundaries between 
independent research and the promotion of specific agendas   
3) The leverage and ability Brussels-based think tanks have to introduce innovative solutions 
is linked to their position in the Brussels-based network and to their history, small as it may 
be, in the process of European integration.  
The first and second hypotheses seem, at least initially, conflictual in character. Knowledge 
brokers are supposed to be neutral intermediaries with no direct interests in the different 
worlds they are bringing.  In the case of think tanks the boundaries between the policy 
research and the policy implementation communities are by definition blurred, since think 
tanks produce scientific research. They translate and disseminate their own research 
findings while linking the explicit knowledge of the researchers to the tacit knowledge of the 
corporate and administrative members that participate in their processes. However, this sort 
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of knowledge much as it takes into consideration the various interests of the different 
stakeholders, is meant to be neutral and based on rigid scientific methodologies. Neutrality 
and independency are the most crucial variables in this hypothesis and in order to 
operationalize their presence I analyze the professional backgrounds of the people who 
actually conduct the policy research in some eminent Brussels-based think tanks. I use tables 
to shed light on these people professional backgrounds and to see if I can find instances of 
direct involvement to the European policy making community. What is important here is to 
show whether this presence is more evident among the researchers (the resident think tanks 
members) or the more independent constituencies (Governing Boards and Members). 
Findings towards the former would point to a high level of biased research and doubt the 
neutrality of the knowledge brokerage framework whereas findings towards the latter to a 
greater degree of independency and an actual knowledge brokerage function. Adding to the 
quantitative research, I make use of the insights from the interviews I conducted in Brussels 
to see whether I can find instances of a lack of independency. Every think tank member has a 
legitimate interest in defending her institution’s independency. This independency is 
formally stated in every think tank’s statute and mission statement as well as in presentation 
of the formal agenda setting processes. Nonetheless, I do believe that a closer examination 
in these people’s discourse, based on my face-to-face interaction with them, can reveal their 
own interpretation of these formal boundaries and the degree to which they are respected.  
My third hypothesis is what establishes the unease connection between power and 
knowledge influence and as mentioned before, is more difficult to pin down and 
operationalize. The object of this hypotheses moves from the more general knowledge 
brokerage framework, according to the first hypothesis commonly found in all Brussels-
based think tanks, to specific differences between think tanks themselves. What I am looking 
for here is instances, of policy recommendations attributed to specific think tanks. The 
problem here is that it is nearly impossible to trace the origin of an idea to a specific 
institution or to a particular person. In Diane Stone’s words: “proof of influence is 
elusive…and it is a rare occurrence that a policy outcome can be attributed to one 
organization” (International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences, 15670). 
Considering this conundrum, what I find more useful for this hypothesis is not try to examine 
the relation between a policy recommendation and its implementation or not, but the 
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variable of innovative suggestions, linking the knowledge brokerage framework to insights 
offered by network literature. In this case, it is history that offers insights and exploratory 
explanations on why one idea cultivated in the one or the other think tank. Much as 
Brussels-based think tanks, as stated earlier, are relatively new constructions there are 
examples in the literature and the press that allow us to hypothesize on the connection 
between the history of a think tank, its degree of establishment within the European 
environment  and its capacity to offer innovative political and economic recommendations. 
According to this hypothesis, a higher degree of established liaisons and connections would 
point to a minimized capacity for innovative ideas whereas a lower degree of such 
established connections would allow for greater innovation.  
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Part II. Empirical Findings 
Before I begin with the empirical component of my thesis I will briefly present three 
important reasons why I consider European think tanks different from their American 
counterparts. This analysis is needed since before going into the details of the organizational 
structure of the institutes under investigation, it should become clear that there are 
structural reasons why Brussels-based think tanks do not exhibit similar degrees of 
partisanship and politicization as in the US.  
Firstly, there is the issue of membership: the majority of think tank researchers and analysts 
come from the academia and they have previous experience as researchers and analysts 
with only a few of them coming from political or corporate backgrounds. Second, the 
majority of Brussels-based think tanks have multi-faceted sponsorship and membership 
programmes seeking diverse funding resources. Lastly, the relative short history of these 
institutes within a political construction – the EU- that combines elements of different sorts 
of governance which are still evolving and reshaping. For think tanks, as institutes born in 
this multi-faceted environment, it is still uncertain what their actual role is. But this difficulty 
to discern their permanent functions from the more specific instances of influence is what 
makes the think tank world fascinating and worth studying.  
 
Three reasons why Brussels-based think tanks are different from their American 
counterparts 
A Sparse Exchange of Personnel 
Brussels-based think tanks lack a Revolving Door policy. In the US, private research 
organizations have played a pivotal role in providing functioning expertise, operating outside 
government bureaucracies (International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences, 
11599). Controversy arises when such private organizations are manned with former 
personnel from those same government bureaucracies they try to assist. The struggles 
between technocratic bureaucracies and (Conservative) policy activists, that solidified think 
tanks’ presence in the American political scene (Medvetz 2012), and the eventual 
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convergence of administrative agencies and such think tanks, was greatly promoted by an 
exchange of political and research personnel, severely limiting independent research.  
However, at the time being, this “revolving door” phenomenon does not appear to be the 
norm in European think tanks. “European public administrations and political career patterns 
are still quite different – not only from the US but also from one another – and rarely show 
anything remotely comparable to the American “spoils system” (Missiroli & Ioannides 2012: 
13). This belief in the relative independence of think tanks and the policy making world was 
in verbatim corroborated by an interviewee in the following passage:   
“US think tanks have the revolving door policy for instance, people move in and out, and 
when they move out they actually experience new learning processes which they can later 
adapt to their work if they go back to think tanks (from the academia)…in Brussels you do not 
have that, some people move from think tanks to the Institutions but they rarely go 
back…which means that it is harder to foster those learning process”. (Brussels Interview, 
Think Tank Programme Director, 7/5/2015) 
Think tank members have every reason to defend their independent position from the 
European officials and bureaucrats, as this ensures independency in policy making and 
increased credibility to outsiders (Medvetz 2012: 23).  In order to verify the introduced 
quote by Missiroli & Ioannides and to validate the statement of the aforementioned 
interviewee, I decided to examine whether this revolving door is indeed existent also in 
European think-tanks. By taking the professional backgrounds as my independent variable 
and checking the past occupational positions of permanent policy analysts in five eminent 
think tanks I corroborate that their majority is in fact not related to any such previous 
employments. Brussels-based think tanks are independently manned by people who do have 
experience as experts in European topics, proven by their consistent participation in 
European committees and testimonies. Nonetheless, as shown in Table 1, the majority of 
think tank analysts and researchers have not been previously employed in any European 
institution, thus indicating that the revolving door aspect is limited in the personnel of 
Brussels European think tanks. The data here refer to the permanent personnel of the think 
tanks under investigation and I examined the CV’s of the analysts involved as evident from 
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the think tanks’ websites. In the few cases they were not available I conducted an on-line 
research.  
Table 1 (Number of think tank analysts’ with previous positions in the EU) 
 EPC Bruegel Carnegie CEPS (senior staff) Egmont 
Total number of policy 
analysts (Resident only) 
17+(175) 11 14 18 12 
Former official EU 
employments 
1+ (9) 2 1 5 3 
Policy experts to a European 
Body6 
7 6 3 11 3 
 
Different legal regime and different sponsorship opportunities 
Secondly, there is a difference in the legal regime concerning think tanks and their obligation 
to disclose their sponsors and donors. There is still controversy concerning the extent to 
which the need for transparency has positive or negative effects on think tanks. However, 
there is little doubt that Brussels-based think tanks are under pressure to reveal their 
connections to the corporate world and the degree of lobbying they exercise. In the US think 
tanks receive aid from the government in terms of tax exemptions and in Europe in the form 
of direct financing from the European Research Framework Programmes. However, in the 
former case that can be considered an incentive for private organizations to fund think tanks 
whereas in the later a source of discouragement.  
In the United States most  think tanks are tax exempt under the 501 ( c ) ( 3 ) section of the  
Internal Revenue Code that includes organizations with religious, charitable, scientific… or 
educational purposes (Harvard Law Review 2002, 1505-6). For private foundations that wish 
to contribute to these type of organizations the “expenditure responsibility clause” , which 
requires the grant provider and the grant receiver to report to the IRS and assure the 
charitable purpose of the grant, is not necessary. Thus, private foundations have a strong 
                                                          
5
 The number in the parenthesis refers to the external experts to EPC, who mostly provide guidance to the 
think tank. It is evident that the number of former European employees rises when we include external experts 
in the analysis. However they contribute only a small number of publications as will be shown later in the 
thesis. 
6
 As advisors, committee participants, participating in testimonials etc. This is indicative not of a formal 
European political employment  but a proof of transaction and immediate (personal) knowledge of European 
actors and processes 
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incentive to contribute to tax exempt think tanks (ibid, 1505). Moreover, much as a Congress 
initiative augmented the transparency of organizations falling under the 501 (c ) (3) section, 
by forcing them to publically provide information about their purpose and financial status, 
they are still not required to disclose their donors ( p. 1509). 
The relative abundant resources for funding that the American system provided for think 
tank research and the fact that they usually come from a rather ideologically homogenous 
group of sponsors (more often Republican and to a lesser extent Democrat)  partly explains 
the discrepancy in the number of think tanks in the US and Brussels. Brussels-based think 
tanks have been urged to sign up to the Joint Transparency Register of the European 
Commission and European Parliament and endorse its Code of Conduct in order to acquire 
access to European grants (Transparify, March 4, 2014). According to the Code, all interest 
representatives are required, next to stating the interests and aims they promote, to specify 
the clients they represent (Transparency Register, Code of Conduct (a)). Although the 
Register is on a voluntary basis and it is subject to selective disclosure and donor capture 
(Transparify ibid.), most Brussels-based think tanks have already registered.  
The sparse funding options for European think tanks mean that they seek a plurality of 
donors, ranging from member states and corporations to international agencies and non-
governmental organizations. Bruegel’s membership for instance consists of 18 European 
states, 33 corporate members and 10 international institutions or agencies, such as the 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the European Investment Bank. 
Given this funding pluralism, witnessed in most European think tanks, it seems next to 
impossible for individual stakeholders to dictate strategies strictly tailored for their separate 
agendas.  
Adding to that, Brussels-based think tanks have been severely hit by the current crisis, 
struggling to find access to funding resources. This urgency to diversify their sponsorship, 
which was evident even before crisis, can partly explain why not many European think tanks 
are now formed in Brussels (Boucher et al. p. 73). “Euro-think tanks are seeking to meet 
changes in their operating environment through more deliberate fund-raising, networks and 
cooperation, greater specialization, financial transparency, and even performance 
measurement” (ibid. p. 1). However, the value of think tanks as research institutions lies in 
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the quality of the research they produce and in order to attract membership they need to 
exhibit solid research. As the following interviewee hints, such diversification is a source of 
consensus–seeking, rather distant to the partisan role many national think tanks perform:  
“…(due to the crisis) there has been huge pressure on think tank market and some of them 
had to change, we had to make strategic decisions, but given the nature of the business you 
cannot compromise on quality and that is common knowledge to all think tankers....”  
(Brussels Interview, Think Tank Programme Director, 7/5/2015) 
The Political System 
Lastly, the relative recent history of Brussels-based think tanks, relative to their American 
counterparts is directly linked to the process and shape of the European Union’s mode of 
governance. Think tanks in Brussels are a result of European integration and although there 
are instances of them contributing to the shape and form of the European scheme (Ullrich 
2004, 56), they are its products and not its initiators. In many national contexts, as is the 
case in the US, think tanks were advocators of ideologies and they served a specific function 
of promoting one research agenda over another, concerning the big American ideological 
debates over welfare policies (Medvetz 2012, 88-101).  
In the European Union, the Europeanization process used to be a lot less politicized since it is 
a topic that largely departs from the traditional left-right partisan debates. Moreover, 
European integration was until the 1990’s a process of the “permissive consensus” that gave 
insulated elites the right to negotiate the common European future (Hooghe and Marks, 
2008). Think tanks’ role in this process seemed to be to shed light on specific issues and 
policies concerning the degree of and the direction of European integration. The more 
governments stopped being the only legitimate source of authority and the more the 
European Union moved towards a multi-level mode of governance, “the possibilities for 
policy research disconnected from specific organizational settings has become increasingly 
feasible and fashionable” (Stone 2008, 11). In the absence of the traditional Republican-
Democrat dichotomy the importance of think tanks as bridges between the different power 
centers and as interpreters of different interests rose. The exact place and function they can 
perform in this changing political landscape is still unclear.   
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Think Tanks’ organizational structure  
In this part of my thesis I try to depict the organizational structure of Brussels-based think 
tanks. My goal is to inquire the assumption that this organizational structure affects the 
nature of social knowledge think tanks produce. Using insights from the general literature on 
knowledge brokerage, I describe the interactions between what can be called “managing 
think tank constituencies” (Member Councils, Governing Boards) and the actual resident 
think tank staff, the people who eventually conduct and publish the research (Senior and 
Junior Analysts), with think tank Directors serving as a bridge between them. By providing a 
rather loose knowledge brokerage framework, I try to explain how these processes and 
mechanisms link the objective social knowledge that researchers aim for with the tacit 
knowledge that the managing constituencies provide. 
Nowadays, most Brussels-based think tanks are organizations with distinctive internal 
management and governance structures. By examining the organizational models of the 
most eminent Brussels-based think tanks, as evident on their websites, I divide this structure 
into main organizational groups. Based on the interpretation of the interviews I conducted 
with some of these think tanks members, I analyze the specific role these groups hold in 
shaping their research agenda.  It should be stated from the beginning that this does not 
constitute a clear-cut separation of responsibilities and boundaries. As a matter of fact, as I 
hope will eventually become evident, think tanks appear to have their own internal 
knowledge brokers and intermediaries, eventually raising the question of the relative value 
of these in-betweeners within the organizations. However, it is clear that not all think tank 
members participate in the research and analysis process. 
As will be shown a great amount of think tank research is conducted by independent 
contributors, whether they are called, visiting fellows, visiting or non-resident scholars. 
These people publish an important portion of the different think tanks’ papers and 
contribute significantly to the research and analysis production. This participation from 
individuals outside the organization can raise questions about who these people are and 
what their backgrounds and professional capital is. Since it was induced that the revolving-
door system cannot be found in think tanks maybe these independent members constitute a 
“hidden door” for former or even current EU officials or corporate members to present and 
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advocate for their opinions against the backdrop of prestigious policy research institutes. In 
any case that could be indicative of a compromised autonomy on the part of think tanks. An 
analysis of who these independent contributors are provides no substantial evidence for 
such an inference. As a matter of fact, in their majority, these independent members are 
themselves researchers in the academia or in policy research institutes. In some cases, with 
CEPS as the most eminent example, they are members of an affiliate to the think tanks 
institute in one of its formal network associations (i.e. ENERPI7).   
Brussels-based think tanks and the profiles of their Independent Contributors 
CEPS 
The Center for European Policy Studies (CEPS), which was officially founded in 1983, is 
chronologically the first European think tank. It maintains a strong in-house research 
capacity with 59 senior fellows and research staff, concluding a vast number of publications, 
85 for the first half of 2015 so far. Economic policy occupies a majority of them, but topics 
on other areas such as security, justice and home affairs, energy, agricultural and foreign 
policy are also included. It is a generalist think tank with an academic character (Perez 2014) 
due to its commitment to high quality research. CEPS is an integral part of several EU 
research networks and funding from the Commission’s Research Framework (E7) constitutes 
the majority of its resources (Missiroli & Ioannides 2012:15). Other than the European 
institutions (European Commission, Committee of Regions, European Parliament), a number 
of corporate members also provide resources for CEPS research. Daniel Gros, an eminent 
figure in Brussels political environment (Ullrich 2004, 56) is currently CEPS director and Karel 
Lannoo its chief executive. From the information found on its website, the highest governing 
body seems to be the Board of Directors, with 11 members, with a long history in eminent 
political and corporate positions, and two ex officio members who are also immediately 
involved in the think tank’s management and research (Daniel Gros and Karel Lannoo).  
Researchers are divided into senior and research staff with the former publishing the 
majority of papers with the research staff’s assistance (Table 2). A significant portion of the 
publications comes from independent members who are to a great part university 
professors and members or directors of other policy research institutes (Table 3).  
                                                          
7
 http://www.enepri.eu/ 
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Table 2. CEPS Publications Categorized by Staff Members (2015) 
Independent Members 16 18,9% 
Senior Staff 25 29,4% 
Research Staff 11 13% 
Co-edits. Independent+Senior 17 20% 
Co-edits. Independent+ Research 4 4,7% 
Co edits. Senior+Research 8 9,4% 
Executive Member (Board)  3 3,5% 
Total 85 98,9% 
 
Table 3. Professional backgrounds of independent contributors to CEPS Publications (2015)8 
University Professors and Institutional Affiliations 2 3% 
Researchers 13 22% 
Professors and Research Institute Affiliates9 39 65% 
NGO members 1 1,5% 
Corporate Members 5 8% 
Total 60 99,5% 
 
EPC 
The European Policy Center (EPC) was launched in 1997 and is more policy analysis –
oriented rather than focusing on in house research (Ullrich 2004, 56). It is, similarly to CEPS, 
a generalist think tank with less focus on economic topics and a broad European political 
analysis research agenda (Missiroli & Ioannides 2012: 17). Contrary to CEPS, the EPC 
emphasizes outreach activity, hosting numerous events and serving as a platform for 
communication and exchange of views between its members and EU or members state 
officials (Ullrich 2004: 57). It currently has 350 members from the corporate, business and 
institutional world. However, when the old generation of leaders changed, the new 
managers tried to augment its policy contributions and its policy shifted to a more balanced 
                                                          
8
 Wherever the CEPS website did not provide adequate information on the contributors a search online was 
used in order to retrieve the authors CVs. In two cases, this research did not provide adequate information and 
the members were not included in the data. Also in many publications two or more independent members co-
worked 
9
 They can either hold a teaching position in a University and/or running and assisting a research institute. All 
hold PhD degrees 
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output of analysis and events (Brussels interview EPC member, 05/05/2015). For the past 
years its research has been divided into five distinct programmes, each with each own 
director. Its governance comprises of a General Assembly of four members, which is the 
highest decision-making body of the EPC, approving its budget and accounts and a 
Governing Board of three members that guides its overall management based on the 
implementation of the organization’s strategic plan. The Chief executive Fabian Zuleeg, who 
is also a Chief Economist, is accountable to the Board and assures the overall management 
of the EPC. 
In accordance with the rationale that primarily “white-collar” researchers perform most 
research, and not members of the higher echelon of think tanks, EPC’s residence staff 
publishes the vast majority of the analysis (Table 4). Moreover, in line with the previously 
stated hypothesis that European think tanks maintain a more independent approach to their 
research, largely due to increased numbers of academics amongst their ranks, a number of 
external experts with academic backgrounds contribute to the EPC’s work (Table 5). 
 Table 4. EPC Publications Categorized by staff members (Two year period-2014/2015) 
Senior Advisers 5 6,4% 
Policy Analysts 44 56% 
Independent  15 19% 
Co-edits. Independent+Policy Analyst 12 15,3% 
Independent+ Senior 2 2,5% 
Total10 78 99,2% 
 
Table 5.  EPC Independent Members Publications (2015) 
Professors/research Institutes 13 57% 
Former Diplomats/Institutions11 8 35% 
Researchers 1 4% 
Journalists 1 4% 
Total 23 100% 
                                                          
10
 Collective Publications as they appear on the publications list were not included 
11
 In many cases these are former academics with a long experience in diplomatic services and/or international 
institutions. In most cased I chose to include them in the first or second category depending on the years that 
have passed since their last academic position but it remains an arbitrary distinction. It should be noted that 
their contributions include mostly publications on topics of foreign policy and geopolitics.  
36 
 
BRUEGEL 
Brussels European and Global Economic Laboratory (Bruegel) held its first Board Meeting in 
January 2005 and as its name suggests it is a think tank specializing in economics. It was the 
culmination of a shared idea of two eminent French economists Nicolas Véron and Jean 
Pisani-Ferry (Bruegel’s first director). It is not clear how this idea was picked up and turned 
into an initiative from Jacques Chirac and Gerhard Schröder in a Joint Declaration in Paris in 
2003 to create a European center of economic studies, but shortly afterwards the French 
and German ministries of finance established a bilateral working group with this purpose. 
Eleven European stated decided to support the project “conditional to successful fundraising 
from the private sector”. Mario Monti served as its first Chairman, after leaving the 
European Commission and he still holds the title of the organization’s honorary President.  
Bruegel exhibits a solid organizational structure and an exemplary governance model which 
can be attributed to the quality of its personnel, managerial staff and a number of 
management and development specialists, as well to the plurality and relative abundance of 
its funding resources. Bruegel membership consists of 18 Member states whose contribution 
depends on each country’s GDP, 33 corporations who all pay 50,000 euros annually and 9 
institutional members including central and private banks. Its overall budget is around 4 
million euros per year. The Member Assembly is Bruegel’s highest governing body and it 
meets in May and November of every year. Its main function is to help design and approve 
the research programme through a process which was in detail described by one Bruegel   
administrator:  
“so they help us in terms of writing our research agenda, we meet with them they tell us 
what they think is going to be in the policy agenda and what Bruegel’s value-added would 
be. We then, we then (emphasis by the speaker), write a draft agenda and we have bilateral 
consultations with all of our members and other stakeholders, and people outside Bruegel,  
to understand what the policy area is, what the question is, whether we are the right people 
to answer it… that is a consultation process that last about 6 weeks and then it is ratified by 
the Board. Once the research program is set we publish it and the Member’s role is over, but 
that does not mean we do not talk to our members about the work we are doing” (Brussels 
Interview, 7/5/2015) 
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The State and corporate members elect 3 members of Bruegel’s Governing Board each and 
they appoint the other 5 (11 in total). The Board of Directors consists of eminent individuals 
with backgrounds in government, business and academia and other than approving the 
research programme and the budget it assists the overall management of the organization in 
direct access to Bruegel’s Director. Jean-Claude Trichet is currently chairman of the Board.  A 
quick look at the Board of Directors of Bruegel Institute counts 4 members that held or still 
occupy administrative or advisory positions within their national governments i.e. as 
Treasurers at their national Ministry of Finance, 2 members with important corporate 
backgrounds, 3 members with professional experience both as civil servants and corporate 
members and one member with an academic position that has also served in ministerial 
posts. Many of them have had some professional experience within the World Bank, from 
different positions. 
As evident from the data there is a great number of independent researchers and analysts 
who do not hold a permanent position with Bruegel but nonetheless contribute significantly 
to its publications, nearly as much as the resident scholars (33% and 35% respectively). An 
examination of their professional background proves that in their vast majority they are 
current or former academic scholars with experience in research institutes. The data show 
no important inference of independent political or corporate figures in the contributions to 
Bruegel publications. That is largely in accordance with the high quality and the academic 
character of the research Bruegel promises to maintain.  
Table 6. Bruegel Publications by authors (2 year period 2014/2015) 
Non-Resident/Visiting 
Scholars 
22 33% 
Resident Scholars12 23 35% 
Co-edits. 
Independent+Senior 
9 14% 
Co-edits. Senior+ Research 
Assistants 
12 18% 
Total 66 100% 
 
                                                          
12
 Director’s publications were counted as part of the resident  scholars publications and when they were co-
authorships with independent members they were categorized accordingly 
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Table 7. Independent Members Contributions Bruegel (2015) 
University and Institutional 
Positions13  
16 62% 
Institutional Positions14 6 23% 
PhD candidates 4 15% 
total 26 100% 
 
CARNEGIE EUROPE 
Carnegie Europe is part of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace a network of 
think tanks that begun with the expansion of the historic American think tank in different 
parts of the world. Carnegie Europe was founded in 2007 and is a small think tank with 
limited in house research capacities, focusing on topics of foreign policy and geopolitics. The 
bulk of its analysis comes from non-resident and associate members as well as visiting 
scholars with Judy Dempsey, an eminent figure with long experience in diplomatic 
correspondence signing a big part of its publications. Its governance is directly linked to the 
Washington Center and Jan Techau is its current director. Field work research revealed that 
the small number of young researchers, although they all have backgrounds on political 
science or relevant disciplines mostly conduct outreach activities, such as assisting in 
organizing events, establishing communications and seeking financial resources. 
It makes little sense to try to analyze the backgrounds of the independent contributors to 
Carnegie’s publications since this think tank occupies only a small permanent staff with 
mostly organizational responsibilities. Since Carnegie is a think tank that mostly focuses on 
geopolitics and foreign policy, the majority of its researchers are people with previous 
diplomatic experience and they exhibit in situ knowledge of the geographic area or topic 
they analyze. In my own interpretation, and in accordance with the hypothesis that 
European think tanks base their analysis on independent contributors, what is witnessed in 
                                                          
13
 Some serve as advisers to more than one research or policy institute but they have all held or still hold some 
position in academia (public or private universities). Some of them only hold their university positions at the 
moment but they have institutional experience (ECB EBRD, Ministries of Finance). The point is to show the 
relevance of the academic field in the think tank functioning (i.e. publications) and that is mainly inferred from 
their working experience in universities. 
14
 That does not mean they do not have academic backgrounds but they are currently working in some 
institution or international agency. All Fellows at large fall into this category 
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Carnegie is typical of a think tank that originates in the American think tank world and the 
way it works. American think tanks are mostly based on people with practical experience 
and personal interference in the topics they analyze. This phenomenon is more evident in 
Carnegie than in any other of the think tanks under investigation and can be considered 
symptomatic of the different approaches European and Brussels-based think tanks employ in 
their organizational structure and work.  
Table 8. Carnegie Publications categorized by authors (2015) 
Non-resident/Senior Associate/Director 17 55% 
Co-edits.  
Visiting Scholar+ Research Staff 
5 16% 
Independent 6 19% 
Co edits. Independent+ Associate or Visiting 3 10% 
Total 31 100% 
 
Researchers and fellows publish their papers based on an agenda set and discussed in 
congruity with Members. But according to think tank researchers interviewed, the agenda is 
set under general guidelines and it is quire flexible. Here is what a think tank senior 
researcher replied when he was asked about the degree of independence in drafting his own 
papers and how it is different from the academia, where he was until recently participating. 
His answer is worth presenting in length:  
“Once a year we also meet at the senior economists meeting, where we do a brainstorming 
with members, and we form an agenda for the next year, just to have a feeling of what is 
interesting at the moment in the policy world, but the agenda is flexible, if we come up with 
new ideas, we are not bound by it”  
In a way academic papers are more done from a scientific point of view in the sense that you 
try to create knowledge whereas here the goal is to create policy recommendation, you use 
knowledge that already exists, you use data to discover some facts, but the goal is not to 
produce knowledge itself but to highlight some policy debate”. 
In academia your work is bounded within what is publishable, after you are in those 
boundaries them you can work on whatever you want- in the think tank world boundaries 
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exist within what is interesting to the policy world what is relevant from a policy point of 
view. The reasons why you conduct research is what distinguishes the different boundaries” 
(Brussels Interview, Think Tank Research Fellow, 04/05/2015).  
The majority of the above described think tank researchers are people who have obtained 
Doctorate Degrees from various university departments. In Bruegel and CEPS this number, 
for senior researchers and scholars, almost reaches 100%. Some of them have occupied 
various institutional and corporate positions or have worked in other policy research 
institutes. Nonetheless, in their majority they share a very similar cultural capital in terms of 
education and previous employments. From this it can be extracted that they know what 
scientific methodologies and data analysis comprise of and what the “right way to do 
science” means. However, not all interviewees confirmed a connection to an academic 
approach to the kind of analysis they conduct 
“Some of the things I do, I do not need to do a huge amount of research and reading because 
I have a sort of accumulated intellectual capital, which I can re-use and I can have the 
younger people to do the actual field research… but this is my biggest fear, what will I do if I 
run out of it…so what I am trying to do is to include in the projects I am working on a new 
component, something that will oblige me to do my own research, but I do not do much 
academic reading for instance”  (Brussels Interview, 07/05/15 Think Tank Research Member) 
It is open to debate whether policy research for societal, political or economic matters should 
be confined to technical issues, data analysis and mathematical- statistical models. For the 
think tank world it is essential to understand how the outcomes of the research might affect 
or draw reactions from the private and public worlds. In one above quote this research 
fellow very eloquently described the major difference between the two approaches; it is the 
reasons for conducting policy research in think tanks. It can be hypothesized that reasons 
also guide methodological choices and install a layer of interpretation, on the researcher’s 
part, based on the interaction he has had with the immediate recipients of his findings; 
those that will be eventually affected by the outcome of the debate he participates, the 
think tank members. It is a very strong argument to say that this interaction limits the 
autonomy of a researcher, as a social scientist, as Medvetz deduces for the aggregate output 
of think tanks’ social science research in America. Boundaries can be mostly understood as 
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framing the practical context within which a think tank researcher should guide his research. 
In Brussels-based think tanks this does not appear to be a limiting factor in the sense of 
guiding the results, but only in terms of how relevant these findings will be. 
Moreover, as shown by the quantitative analysis, independent contributors to think tanks’ 
publications are in their vast majority people from academic backgrounds with long 
experience in university departments. The general trend is that think tanks which focus on 
economic issues often collaborate with university professors from economic departments. 
Think tanks that are mostly concerned with foreign policy topics and geopolitics encourage 
the contributions of former diplomats and people with an inside knowledge of the area 
under analysis. As evident there are discrepancies from one think tank to another but overall 
the profiles of the independent members reveal a degree of academic consistency and 
scientific engagement that can be considered a sign of the independent character of the 
research they conduct.  
Junior Researchers and their main functions 
Senior researchers and resident staff constitute the majority of think tank members. 
Concerning their professional experience as researchers and the work they conduct in a 
think tank they stand somewhere in the middle of the think tank hierarchy with junior 
researchers and think tank directors occupying the two poles. The role of directors in the 
network of Brussels-based professionals will be only superficially examined here. To do 
justice to the young people that work in think tanks I will provide an overview of what their 
main functions are.  
Brussels-based think tanks employ a significant number of young researchers who occupy 
assistant positions. In their majority, they have recently graduated from European university 
departments with master’s degrees and are in the beginning of their career or are young 
professionals with small experience in the Brussels working environment. My personal 
impression of these people is that they are intelligent graduates, eager to learn in the 
competitive think tank world and happy to make part of the interconnected network of 
policy research and policy practice, maintaining their ideological orientations. The following 
abstract reveals the importance of participating in a think tank for these young researchers:  
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 “In the previous organization where I worked we did not have the same sort of environment 
in terms of new ideas, it feels to me now that there is more openness in ideas, policy activism 
you do not expect to find here …in an institution or in academia even, it seems a bit vulgar to 
express strong opinions about controversial topics” (Interview Research Assistant, 4/5/2015)  
This attribute may be characteristic of the younger think tank members,  who enter the 
Brussels scene eager to discover the “rules of the game” with ideological tendencies that 
might subside in due time. Someone who has been working in Brussels for a few years 
described the first six months of working in that poly-centric, multicultural mosaic of 
corporations, NGO’s and European institutions as “the honey moon, where everything seems 
fascinating and interesting, you spend endless time at the office and you actually like it, it is a 
whole new world working there” (Think tank researcher, personal correspondence). 
Unfortunately these think tank members make only a marginal contribution to the think 
tank’s research output. Often they assist the research fellows and members in drafting their 
papers by providing data analysis and information. However, most of the times they are 
occupied with administrative responsibilities and positions such as, communication 
assistants, events coordinators or assistants, exploring funding and membership possibilities. 
When they make part of the administrative team they serve a brokerage role as they need to 
maintain connections and the relations to potential members. This is an important function 
since keeping the flow of communication open between the researchers and the sponsors, 
while assuring the entrance of new members, is essential for a think tank’s overall success. 
“If they approach us for membership I have to maintain that contact and the relationship… I 
also need to approach certain companies to seek membership possibilities”  (Brussels 
Interview, 04/05/2015 Think Tank Communications Assistant) 
 
Climbing High in the Echelon: Think Tank Governing Boards and Directors 
Think tank directors are eminent figures with an established presence in the Brussels 
professional environment, and backgrounds in one or more than one European institutions, 
the academia, International Organizations of economic and security orientation and very 
often they exhibit professional experience in more than one such position. They combine a 
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knowledge broker’s personal skill set and they are able to perform the main brokerage 
functions (turning problems into questions, guiding research and establishing 
communication (CHSFR 2003: 1) with success. They act as representatives of the think tank 
researchers to the Board’s members by linking the two groups. Moreover they encapsulate 
what Stone (1996) terms “competent policy entrepreneurs”. They are in a sense charismatic 
figures that seem to gather an entrepreneur’s required personal skill set; social acuity, 
defining problems, building teams and leading by example (Mintron & Norman 2009: 3, 
CHSFR 2003: 1) Their role as policy entrepreneurs/policy brokers and the importance of the 
social capital they bestow to the organization will be more extensively examined later in the 
thesis where the potential for innovative idea production in think tanks will be examined.  
The Board of Governors and the Members’ Council act as gatekeepers on behalf of the think 
tank to the policy and corporate community, with the aim of acquiring resources, building 
connections and bridges. Acquiring resources does not refer to fund raising processes which 
are conducted by the think tank’s administrative staff, but it is rather the symbolic capital 
they bestow on the think tank, attracting the support of eminent figures and corporations of 
the Brussels world.  An invitation to participate in a task force, a talk or any other sort of 
event carries a lot greater weight and prestige when it bears the signature of Jean Claude 
Trichet (Bruegel) for example. Their social capital in the network of Brussels professionals 
and civil servants can also be a source of attraction for high ranking officials to participate 
and give their opinions in panels and conferences organized by the think tank. They act as 
gatekeepers in the sense that they grant outsiders, corporate members and public officials, 
access to the think tank group (Gould & Fernandez 1989:  92).  
 
Brokerage mechanisms: Network Brokerage and Knowledge Translation  
These Mechanisms or “exercises” as think tank members call them include the transaction 
and communication fora that serve as platforms of communication between the researchers 
and the different stakeholders. They can be characterized as trust-building events between 
the policy makers and the researchers which serve to evaluate the credibility of the research 
produced. At the same time, and due to their “dialogical” nature these events help the 
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researchers appreciate different perspectives of the panel members as well as the extent to 
which knowledge disseminated by the think tank organizing a specific event is actually being 
taken into consideration and applied. There are different kinds of public and closed events 
organized by the various think tanks and they include; talks, debates, seminars, internal and 
external conferences, workshops, task forces and panels. I will briefly describe some of them 
to give a picture of what they consist of and using insights from the interviewees, shortly 
analyze how they can affect the research conducted in think tanks.   
Task Forces are groups of experts consisting of 25-30 members, with balanced 
representation from senior members of different stakeholders that meet under a think 
tank’s chairmanship to discuss specific topics under a more general framework. A prospectus 
is being disseminated many months in advance to the first meeting, to targeted individuals 
with provisional key topics to be discussed, a provisional meeting schedule, revised 
according to availability and participation. The think tank task force program anticipates 
three to four meetings within a period of four-five months in some cases with the 
participation of academics, stakeholders, regulators and supervisors for a topic on financial 
sector resolution. The discussions will be held in the think tank’s premises and will be backed 
by research from think tank’s members under the guidance of a senior think tank member 
who will chair those meetings. 
Events are usually open to the public and they attract some of the most eminent figures of 
Brussels policy makers as well as corporate members. Membership to a think tank provides 
priority access to all events. For the researchers, the value-added to the events lies not only 
to the content presentations but on the discussions afterwards and the conflicting views that 
might emerge (Interview Brussels, Research Assistant 04/05/2015). The choice of 
participants in the panel is directly related to the think tank’s visibility and prestige but also 
to the network position it has acquired in time:  
“In the years we have developed two things a group of friends so there is a core of people 
who are specialists in Brussels, and we have also developed a strategy based on our 
objectives on who to reach out to and this is a process which is managed by the team and 
then once the idea is formed, we go to the scholar and the Director to get any substantive 
input in the content” (Brussels Interview 06/05/2015, Carnegie Europe researcher). 
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Knowledge Brokerage in Think Tank Publications  
Thin tanks publish different sorts of policy papers, depending on their in-house capacities 
and the particular audience they try to reach out to. In Bruegel’s publications one can find 
policy briefs which are directed to non-specialist policy makers and are on average 8 pages 
long. Policy Contributions are between 15-30 pages and they include more original research 
and finally there are Working Papers, the closest to usual academic papers that can be from 
10 to 60 pages. Another kind of paper usually found in think tanks makes part of blogs, 
which can have a more specific focus (An Eye on Greece-Bruegel) or include more general 
themes with the contributions of various EU observers (Judy Dempsey’s Strategic Europe- 
Carnegie Europe). The approach adopted in writing these papers and the need for them to 
have some practical relevance is evident by the quote below and it is revealing about how 
think tankers perceive their position between academic production, news media and the 
policy world:  
“There is no point in writing all these fancy papers with crazy technical models, hopefully 
where we position ourselves is somewhere where is not really academia and it is not just 
news media, if you like, and we try to reach a broader audience, but the foundations and the 
structure of thought is still academic and intelligent and it is not just pure opinion but is 
evidence-based” (Brussels interview Research Assistant, 04/05/2015).  
The framing of a complex policy problem or debate in simple, but not simplistic terms, is 
what accounts for successful brokerage. Operationalizing this debate into concrete 
questions helps both the researchers to their study as well as the practitioners who know 
what particular aspects of a problem to focus on:  
“When you look at banking union that really was our biggest contribution, to boil down 
banking union to seven questions that needed to be answered and what the answers might 
be and who might favor them and what might be the best option and in some cases the least 
worst option, that was fantastic because it actually gave a framework for the people who 
had to decide those things and to sensibly address each of these priorities” (Brussels 
Interview, Bruegel Secretary General, 04/05/2015). 
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I believe that if we think of Brussels-based think tanks in those terms then we should discern 
between the cultural capital of the researchers (educational backgrounds, university 
degrees) and the social capital of the members of Governing Boards and executives. If such a 
distinct categorization was possible then the model that examines think tanks as knowledge 
brokers would apply, with think tanks acting as intermediating arenas where social scientists 
and stakeholders with various interests and directions unite to exchange their approaches, 
and the overall result would be one of bringing the two worlds together in a neutral and 
scientific manner. 
The problem arises when think tank researchers are themselves former corporate or public 
policy members who combine the two sources of capital to research results and knowledge 
production. This can be most evident in the role of think tank directors and a few eminent 
figures who sign the most visible papers in a think tanks publication’s list. In each think tank 
actually there are 3-4 people who sign a majority of papers whether they are conjointly 
drafted or their own work. The real question is whether this truly constitutes a problem for 
the quality and the kind of social knowledge they produce, simply because these people do 
not limit themselves to drafting a good analytic paper, and there is little doubt that their 
papers are scientifically robust, but to the ideas they advocate and the policies they 
prescribe in those papers. It would be easy to suppose that due to their position in a certain 
knowledge network or issue network or advocacy coalition or epistemic community (since it 
is common supposition that ideas expressed by those communities strive to establish the 
common beliefs of that community), the ideas they express have been communally 
discovered and express the interests of a specific social group with shared beliefs and an 
interest to promote one policy over another.  
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Part III. Knowledge Brokers or Policy Entrepreneurs: The room for Innovation 
In this part of my thesis I will depart from the organizational structure, which commonly 
characterizes the majority of think tanks under investigation, and move to more specific 
approaches and differences between them. I will first provide an example of different 
proposals made by Bruegel and CEPS concerning an important topic in the European agenda, 
namely the form of debt sharing among the European states and the mechanisms to achieve 
that. Secondly I give a brief overview of the different perspectives think tanks employed in 
their reaction to a joint initiative from the European Parliament and the European Union, 
namely the Transparency Register. For this second example I draw insights from the 
interviews I conducted in Brussels which revealed to me a discrepancy in the reactions to 
this initiative. These discrepancies in the two examples encouraged me to look further into 
the reasons behind them and to try to explain them examining the position of think tanks as 
institutes and of certain of their members in the network of European institutions and 
professionals situated in Brussels. It is important to stress the individual positions of eminent 
think tank directors as well as the structural position of the think tanks within the Brussels 
network in order to provide a preliminary answer to the question why certain think tanks 
prove more susceptible to innovation than others. Therefore, I begin with a profile overview 
of two eminent figures in the think tank world and I subsequently describe a short history of 
their respective think tanks. 
An Answer to the European Debt Problem 
Nicolas Véron is a French economist and a co-founder of Bruegel along with Jean-Pisani 
Ferry. He is also an independent board member to the Depository Trust and Clearing 
Corporation (DTCC) a global post-trade financial services (mainly securities) company and he 
has served as corporate advisor to the French Ministry of Labor and held other private sector 
positions. He has graduated from the French École Polytechnique and the French École  
Nationale Superieure des Mines de Paris. He is a visiting fellow in the American think tank 
Peterson Institute for International Economics. In September 2012, Véron was included in 
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“Bloomberg Markets second annual 50 Most Influential list with reference to his early 
advocacy of European banking union”15.  
Daniel Gros is a German economist who obtained his PhD from the University of Chicago in 
1984, and he is the Director of CEPS from 1990 until now. Prior to joining CEPS he was 
working for the International Monetary Fund and he stopped his engagement with the think 
tank for a two year period from 1988 to 1990 to serve as advisor to the European 
Commission. During this period he drafted a report on the EMU which “reportedly worked 
its way up to senior German and EC officials, with some aspects reflected in the 1989 Delors 
report” (Ullrich 2004: 56). He has also taught in numerous universities and is the editor of 
two scientific journals focusing on international finance.  
Amidst the European sovereign debt crisis, CEPS and Bruegel published working papers and 
made appearances in the press to provide possible solutions. Bruegel (2010) argued in favor 
of Bluebonds, a separation of public debts to a pooled 60% of GDP, guaranteed by all 
Eurozone countries with all other debt, above the 60% threshold, to remain under national 
responsibility. In 2011, Bruegel re-produced an IMF working paper that advanced the 
Bluebond concept and issued the prospect of “more ambitious projects” such as common 
Eurobonds. This paper drew considerable controversy and media attention. The Center for 
European Policy Studies on the other hand, in the same year proposed clearly more 
moderate alternative, partial bond insurance through the European Stability Mechanism. In 
a similar vein, Daniel Gros (CEPS’ director) repeatedly argued against a joint Eurobond 
project in his personal column and in interviews to international media. The fact is that 
Eurobonds have not been part of the European response to the ongoing crisis, at least for 
the time. But Bruegel Institute, and Nicolas Véron in particular, was one of the first 
advocates of a project that gradually came into fruition into 2014, the European Banking 
Union. Both these projects, Bluebonds and Banking Union were rather radical and innovative 
at the time of their inception and they came from one and the same institute.   
It is my hypothesis that the deeper a think tank has been integrated in the policy and 
knowledge networks of its environment, in this case the European union, the lesser the 
chances of it advocating innovative solutions to pressing problems. Accordingly, the greater 
                                                          
15
 http://www.bruegel.org/about/person/view/910-nicolas-veron/ 
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its dependence on funding resources from the European Union, the margin for innovative 
solutions is decreased.  
CEPS, due to its firm establishment in network ties that are a result of its relatively long 
history in the Brussels environment and its strong dependence on EU funding resources is 
rather subject to inertial effects. Much as it has gained a focal position in the center of 
research and knowledge network which is transmitted to the policy makers, this centrality 
lifts boundaries to the degree of radical proposals it can advocate. This network effect in 
turn shapes the agenda of its researchers, guiding them towards investigating problems and 
seeking solutions through a lens of incremental rather that more innovative change. The 
consensus-seeking, positive-sum perception of European policy making may have had an 
effect on the sort of approaches that are sought. Simultaneously internal networks also 
produce inertial effects. People who have been working together for a very long time and 
have built cohesion and trust in one another are less adaptable to new ideas and 
perceptions (Zaheer & Soda 2009: 5). In simple words, they trust in what and who they 
already know and their future decisions on choosing potential network ties will depend on 
the power they have historically amassed. This network power will lead them to make 
choices of networks closer to their already established affiliations, in such a manner that 
structural constraints inhibit individual innovation. 
Bruegel, on the contrary with a 10 year old history and the plurality of its funding resources 
occupies a rather peripheral position in the Brussels scene; peripheral in the sense that is not 
centered within one world, corporate or institutional. But that renders it closer to Burt’s 
notion of structural holes because it is easier to gather information and insights from 
different perspectives and that facilitates its margin for innovative solutions. By bringing 
together corporate and political interests, often of transnational origins and having invested 
in a resolute academic kind of research, it seems to avoid this inertial effect. At the same 
time the role of personal networks of eminent Bruegel members becomes more effective 
than in the structural limitations posed in CEPS. The smaller size of Bruegel’s research team 
also seems to render it more open to change in personnel and ideas.  Concerning the 
importance of size as a factor that makes a think tank more susceptible to innovation a 
similar effect was witnessed in EPC by one of its members:  
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“…this is very much the case in small think tanks like ours, a consequence of the people who 
work in it…in structures as small as ours personal initiatives can make a difference” (Brussels 
interview 07/05/ 2015, EPC Programme Director). 
The Transparency Register  
After a series of scandals in the European Union (Santer Commission resignation 1999, The 
Bangemann/Telefonica Scandal in the same year) the European Commission decided to take 
action in order to assure the transparent character of the interactions between interest 
groups and Commission officials. The European transparency Initiative was launched in 2005 
that after a series of consultations culminated in the Lobbying Transparency Register in 2008 
on a voluntary basis. Commissioner Calas was a firm exponent of think tanks registration to 
the catalogue16 and that provoked certain controversy whether think tanks are actually 
independent research institutes or express interest representation. The question became 
pervasive by the fact that the European Commission was funding some think tanks through 
its Framework Programmes. The funding component raised the issue of the Commission 
setting the rules of the game and the think tanks following course. If the EU is funding these 
organizations it should at least have some influence on them (by asking them to publicize 
their funding sources and their members’ CVs and declaration of interests).  A configuration 
of power relations came to the fore with the Commission on the one hand assuring think 
tank funding through its research framework programs and think tanks on the other 
providing their knowledge and expertise but refusing to be included in the same category as 
lobbyists. Relational differences in the way different think tanks approached the 
Transparency register point to a conflict of interests between think tanks.  
My research in Brussels introduced me to some unknown elements of this incident and the 
negotiation process that reveal a rarely found field of competition between Brussels-based 
think tanks. Bruegel was a strong opponent to the initial form and content of the Lobbyist 
register and it actively tried to “finess” its approach. Bruegel was already making serious 
efforts to safeguard the integrity and independence of its research and personnel and its 
researchers were already asked to sign a statement of scientific integrity.  
                                                          
16
 http://www.euractiv.com/pa/think-tanks-join-eu-lobby-regist-news-221611 
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“At the beginning we didn’t sign up for a year. The Transparency Register was initially termed 
the Lobbysist register and we had a problem with that. Another problem was that we could 
not initially register as a think tank. And thirdly we could not be given the opportunity to 
explain how our model was not reflecting the interests or the opinions of our members.  We 
tried to engage with the Commission, we wrote to Commissioner Calas.  Other organizations 
also did not initially sign up…They wrote to us and said there was not an umbrella 
organization for Brussels-based think tanks and therefore we would have to fight among 
ourselves to represent all of us. We did disagree over who should go and I highlighted that 
our transparency efforts are not exhausted at the Register”. (Brussels Interview, Bruegel 
General Secretary 4/5/2015) 
The EPC was the first think tank to subscribe to the Transparency Register. This can be 
attributed to its commitment to the values of accessibility and openness but there are two, 
not so evident, reasons why it might have rushed to do so. Firstly, a 2009 report (Smith et 
al.) revealed that the EPC had received money from the British American Tobacco in the 
1990’s to push for the introduction of what is known as “EU Better Regulation Principles” 17 
to assure that corporations, tobacco industries included, would make part of the early stage 
of consultations whenever a policy affecting them would be introduced. This incident 
suggests that the EPC was eager to signal a break from its past and the Transparency 
Register offered an opportunity to do that. On the other hand, the presence of many former 
European officials in the Center’s Governing Structures and external experts’ staff may have 
worked as a leverage mechanism to push the EPC to sign up. Its consolidated position in the 
Brussels environment may have worked again with an inertial effect, this time without 
allowing the think tank to defend its position as a research institute and to claim its right not 
to be included in the same group as lobbyists.  
  
                                                          
17
 http://www.tobaccotactics.org/index.php/European_Policy_Centre 
52 
 
Conclusions 
One of the most interesting aspects of the think tank world is that in it the two communities 
of policy makers and policy researchers are in no case utterly separated. In practice, think 
tank researchers and analysts cannot simultaneously be active policy makers or corporate 
members, due to the conflict of interests and the need to be transparent. The string that 
unites these two worlds is the social capital of the agents. Think tank directors are not the 
only agents that through their social capital link the two worlds. As the empirical research 
shows, in every think tank there is a minority of research staff, directors included, that signs 
the most relevant publications in contemporary policy debates. In principle, that is 
reasonable since as was shown some think tank members are eminent figures in the 
networks of Brussels-based policy and corporate communities. That visibility is a result of 
the prestige and the trust they built with their expertise and professional experience in these 
circles (their social and cultural capital). But the effect these individuals’ perspectives can 
have on the political dialogue, as expressed through the think tank’s dissemination 
platforms, raises the question whether it is actually the scientific vigor that supports their 
ideas placing them high in the policy agenda or whether it is the position they maintain in 
the network of Brussels professionals that grants them access to policy makers. 
By examining think tanks populations I tried to provide a preliminary answer to the question 
how think tanks internal organizational structure and hierarchy affects the independent 
character of the research they conduct. I tried to show that Brussels-based think tanks 
comprise of groups with distinct roles and that in order to evaluate the independence of 
think tanks’ research we should firstly examine the professional backgrounds of the actual 
researchers and analysts. Under this framework, think tanks function as knowledge brokers 
between the world of policy makers, corporate interests and scientific research and they 
serve a very important role. Through the different brokerage mechanisms, publications and 
events, think tanks produce research and analysis that sheds light on complex policy 
problems. At the same time, through these interactions they contribute to the dissemination 
of a knowledge that considers the various stakeholders’ interests and is practically relevant. 
These brokerage mechanisms add to the legitimation and validity of think tanks as 
institutions that produce well informed knowledge enhancing their position in the 
knowledge/power constellation. They also allow think tanks to reap financial rewards, in the 
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form of tenders, contracts and gain more members as well as social rewards in the form of 
more public visibility in the media. 
On the other hand, these brokerage mechanisms conducted by think tanks as organizations 
accrue to the social capital of certain think tank members, augmenting their position in the 
networks that co-exist in Brussels. They allow these members to receive invitations to 
present their research in the highest political level, as in the informal ECOFIN meeting18 . 
However, when these personalities presented their ideas to ECOFIN, they were representing 
not only their organization, as a research institute with its research analysis and findings, 
they were also representing themselves and their own ideas on what the European 
Monetary Union should look like. In that sense these figures act as policy entrepreneurs, 
“building” their expertise through these testimonies. I do not believe that the research 
revealed any sort of “invisible influence”, but the role of networks and connections of think 
tank members is an area for fruitful research. In the end the two concepts knowledge and 
power co-habit the think tank world and these individuals grant their personal capital to the 
think tank they manage but they also benefit from the work of policy analysts who populate 
think tanks’ offices and libraries.  
  
  
                                                          
18
 http://www.guntramwolff.net/cv/ 
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